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Thank you very much, Stephen Burbank. It is a great opportunity to
join you today at the University of Pennsylvania on the seventy-fifth
anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Every senator wakes up
every morning eager to go out and deliver an impassioned speech on the
subject of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. You laugh, but you are here
to listen to a speech on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I imagine that many law students who arrive here at this famous law
school in Philadelphia, the city that hosted our nation’s Constitutional
Convention, dream of litigating epic constitutional cases before the United
States Supreme Court. For the students here, perhaps learning the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may not be very high on your priority list, but you

† United States Senator for Rhode Island. This text is an adaptation from the opening address
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will find out—as I found out—that command of procedure is essential to a
litigator’s prowess.
More broadly, the way we fashion procedure is pivotal to the quality of
justice our system provides. Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas said it well
when he wrote that, “Procedure is the bone structure of a democratic
society.”1 I’m going to ask you to remember two things from this speech.
That’s the first one: “[p]rocedure is the bone structure of a democratic
society.” In short, procedure is power.
Today, I want to focus on the way that civil procedure affects the power
of an important political institution within our system of self-government—
and that is the civil jury.
Let’s start, in this historic place, with some history. The earliest tendrils
of the jury system appeared in England in the twelfth century. By the
fifteenth century, civil juries had blossomed to the point where independent
persons gathered together and heard witness testimony brought by opposing
counsel. When the earliest American settlers came to this land, they
transplanted juries here: 1624 into Virginia, 1628 into Massachusetts, 1677
into New Jersey, and 1682 into Pennsylvania. If you do the math, that makes
last year the 330th anniversary of the Pennsylvania civil jury.
Civil juries provided a treasured means of self-government to early
Americans as they chafed under colonial rule. Efforts by the English
government to deny that right helped foment the American Revolution.
When our original Constitution was silent on the civil jury, Americans
sounded the alarm and the Seventh Amendment2 was promptly sent to the
states in the Bill of Rights.
Alexander Hamilton described this in The Federalist No. 83, where he
stated that:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree
in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury;
or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very
palladium of free government.3

The civil jury: the very palladium of free government.

1
2

ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 60 (1968).
U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.”).
3 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Colonial Americans understood, like Sir William Blackstone, that
“[e]very new tribunal erected, for the decision of facts, without the intervention of a jury . . . is a step towards establishing aristocracy, the most
oppressive of absolute governments.”4 The founders intended the civil jury
to serve as an institutional check on that power by giving ordinary American
people direct control over one vital element of government.
The civil jury is not just a fact-finding appendage of a court. It has an
institutional and structural purpose. Alexis de Tocqueville observed that the
jury should be understood as a “political institution” and “one form of the
sovereignty of the people.”5 Sir William Blackstone explained that trial by
jury “preserves in the hands of the people that share, which they ought to
have in the administration of public justice, and prevents the encroachments
of the more powerful and wealthy citizens.”6 That’s the second line I want
you to remember: the civil jury “prevents the encroachments of the more
powerful and wealthy citizens.”
Uniquely, in a Constitution that is largely devoted to protecting the
individual against the power of the state, the civil jury is designed to protect
the individual against other more powerful and wealthy individuals.
Today, the civil jury remains a political institution. It fosters civic
engagement. It educates citizens about the workings of their government. It
knits together people from all walks of life. It dissolves power down to the
people. It offers a final check on abuse, when other institutions of government
are compromised.
The jury trial has never been the exclusive method for concluding litigation in federal courts, but it is now close to vanishing. When the Civil Rules
were adopted, around eighteen percent of cases were resolved by either a
jury or a bench trial. Now, less than two percent of cases reach a jury or a
bench trial. Most litigants do not have a reasonable prospect of presenting
their claims to a jury of their peers.
Some reasons for this trend are practical. The economics of the modern
legal practice force litigants into early settlement. Judges add to the pressure
with concerns about managing and expediting their dockets. But some
changes come via the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Recent amendments and interpretations governing pleading standards
and motions to dismiss, class action lawsuits, summary judgment, and case
management procedures have all narrowed the gateway to a jury trial. For
4
5

3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 363 ( Francis Bowen ed., Henry
Reeve trans., 7th ed. 1874).
6 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *380.
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example, in Iqbal7 and Twombly,8 the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 12,
which governs motions to dismiss, to eliminate traditional notice pleading
and make it far easier for corporate defendants to dismiss cases. This
prevents plaintiffs from reaching discovery and ultimately presenting their
case to the jury. The Court invented a new “plausibility” standard, whereby
a judge screens a complaint to make his own assessment of the facts and
inferences. As Justice Stevens reminded us in his dissent in Twombly,
“[u]nder the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal Rules, the idea was
not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them in.”9 More and
more, it seems, the trend in judicial interpretation of the Federal Rules is, in
fact, to keep litigants out.
For class actions, the Court interpreted Rule 23 to make it more difficult
for a certified class of plaintiffs to reach a civil jury and prove a pattern of
discrimination. In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 10 the Roberts Court changed the
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), making it far more difficult for
individual citizens who had been injured to join together, bring their case
before a jury, and hold corporate wrongdoers accountable for the
small-denomination, but large-scale, frauds that are the stuff of class actions.
This was an epic change.
In summary judgment, we are still living with the Celotex trilogy from
the 1980s.11 According to the text of Rule 56, summary judgment shall be
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In
Celotex itself, the Court held that the moving party need not produce
evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but merely
show “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case.”12 The burden shifted a little there. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
the Court held the same standard of proof required at trial would also apply
at the summary judgment stage. 13 Since the plaintiff usually bears the
burden of trial, the burden shifted again. Then, in Matsushita v. Zenith, the
Court held the party with the burden of proof at trial must create more than
a “metaphysical doubt” about the relevant facts, solidifying the shift.14
7 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
8 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
9 Id. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
11 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
12 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
13 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-56.
14 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.
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Together, these changes made it easier for courts to grant summary
judgment, and courts took notice. Federal courts have cited this trilogy in
astounding numbers. Anderson has been cited more than 175,000 times,
Celotex, more than 165,000 times, and Matsushita more than 80,000 times.
Amendments to Rule 16, which covers pretrial conferences, case scheduling, and case management, have steered case management more toward
settlement than toward trial. This preference for settlement is going to get
stronger as we have more budget problems in Washington and we have less
money to support the activities of our judiciary.
Twenty-five years ago, when the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rules, 15 Professor
Maurice Rosenberg said that the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 had “helped
shift the center of gravity from the trial to the pretrial stages” of civil
litigation. 16 These amendments cemented the judge's managerial role.
Professor Rosenberg also noted that the word “management,” for the first
time, appeared in the Civil Rules in those 1983 amendments.17
Finally, while not a rule, the growing practice of judges tolerating “paper
blizzard” defense strategies and accepting the accompanying delay in access
to a jury rewards defendants who can bankroll aggressive and imaginative
defense pretrial strategies and “starve out” the plaintiff.
It need not have been this way. Congress intended that changes to the
Civil Rules would take place through the process laid out by the Rules
Enabling Act. Instead, as I have described, many of the most significant
changes in civil procedure—the amendments to Rule 16 aside—have been
made by judicial fiat. The Rules Enabling Act, passed in 1934 and amended
in 1988, requires advisory committees convened by the courts to develop
amendments for the civil rules through a public rulemaking process.18 The
courts then decide whether to transmit such amendments to Congress,
which has seven months to modify or reject those amendments. This
process is intended to reflect the considered views of litigants and judges, to
establish a thoughtful record, and to preserve a meaningful role for Congress. Decisions such as Iqbal and Twombly not only implicitly overruled
precedents, such as Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,19 but also bypassed this rulemaking
15 See Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938–1988, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (1989).
16 Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2197, 2203 (1989).
17 Id. at 2199.
18 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).
19 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
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process and deprived Congress and the public of the roles reserved for them
in the Rules Enabling Act.
The result has been rule changes based on judicial hunch—for example,
that there is widespread plaintiff discovery abuse—rather than on a comprehensive record of evidence. Congress established the Rules Enabling Act
process exactly to avoid this sort of policymaking by judicial guesswork. It is
frustrating when Congress passes laws intended to provide civil judicial
relief for injured parties before civil juries, only to find that courts curtail
that relief through reinterpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Unfortunately, as the lack of a legislative response to the Twombly and
Iqbal cases demonstrates, Congress itself has some blame to bear here.
Congress is not always well-positioned to respond to judicial policymaking.
Still, the present structural challenges should not dissuade us from fighting
for a litigant to have a realistic opportunity to present a factual dispute to a
civil jury. The Founding Fathers would be astounded to see where we have
come.
Congress could help revive the jury trial through the rulemaking process
with a greater substantive focus on jury access and by including diverse
viewpoints on the relevant advisory committees so judicial docket management
and settlement concerns do not trump all else.
We can also accomplish this through legislation that overturns specific
cases that limit jury access. Congress could consider wholesale procedural
changes, such as the creation of a new procedural track enabling simple
cases to move more readily to jury trial. And, it would help if we confirmed
more judges with a proper understanding of the political and historical role
of the civil jury.
Our goal—like the purpose of the Seventh Amendment—should be to
reestablish the special constitutional institution that gives an injured
individual the opportunity to have his or her day in court in front of a group
of peers. We must remember the constitutional role of the jury, the political
role of the jury, the educational role of the jury, and the empowering civic
role of the jury. In doing so, we will be truer to our democracy and to our
history.
Let me close with a more contentious point. This gradual suffocation of
the civil jury is neither random nor coincidental. Blackstone warned, in my
second favorite quote that I asked you to remember, that the civil jury
would be a thorn in the side of the more wealthy and powerful, of those who
are used to special treatment. There, in front of the civil jury, they have to
stand annoyingly equal before the law. As a body that “prevents the
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encroachments of the more powerful and wealthy,”20 the civil jury inevitably
provokes their annoyance, their enmity, and their opposition.
In America nowadays, our most wealthy and powerful beings are corporations, and juries are indeed a thorn in their side. Corporate influence
suffuses the legislative and executive branches. Corporate lobbyists, campaign contributions, and, thanks to Citizens United, 21 unlimited election
spending are all big bucks, and that money is not spent for nothing. Ideas
that corporate power resists can be banished. Reforms that corporations
object to can be stymied. Tax and other arrangements that secure corporate
profits can be achieved. The legislative and executive branches can provide
sweet deals for big corporations.
But that whole tide of corporate money and influence comes to a crashing
stop against the hard square corners of the jury box. There, the proud and
mighty must stand even before the law, with some menial person they have
injured. CEOs and important officials might be obliged to testify. And
rigging the game doesn’t work well. Tampering with legislators and regulators
is a constant, even licensed, corporate activity, but tampering with a jury is a
crime. The jury is, indeed, a thorn in the side of corporations comfortable
astride the rest of government.
It should be no surprise that corporations spread a mythology of greedy
trial lawyers, runaway juries, abusive discovery, and preposterous verdicts. It
should be no surprise that corporations seek the appointment of “businessfriendly” judges. It should be no surprise that an already “businessfriendly” Congress and those “business-friendly” judges steadily whittle
away at our access to this vital and historic American institution of selfgovernment, the civil jury.
The cost of this institution vanishing is high. We measure it in how often
we are frustrated that political might makes right, how often we are frustrated that the voices of the wealthy and powerful fill the halls of government, and how often we are frustrated that lost causes pile up against
bulwarks of well-kept indifference.
I’ll spot you that juries can be a thorn in the side of some and can sometimes be inconvenient. They do take some effort. They require care and
feeding, both figuratively and literally. But I think that an institution that
makes popular sovereignty real, an institution that checks the encroachments of the wealthy and powerful, an institution that will listen when the
ears of the other branches of government are deaf to you, and an institution

20
21

BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *380.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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that brings ordinary Americans together to make important decisions in
their community—that’s an institution that is well worth all the trouble.
I think we should chart our course by the star our Founders followed and
not tread the low path of efficiency, convenience, and accommodation. For
the larger purposes and values our Founders fought for when they built us
this goodly heritage, we should do everything we can to bring the American
civil jury roaring back to life. I humbly propose that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure should support that endeavor.
Thank you very much.

